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Abstract 
Traditional approaches to non-monotonic 
reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible 
axioms for belief revision and suffer from 
conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work 
on ranked preferential models (RPMs) 
promises to overcome some of these 
difficulties. Here we show that RPMs are not 
adequate to handle iterated belief change. 
Specifically, we show that RPMs do not 
always allow for the reversibility of belief 
change. 1bis result indicates the need for 
numerical strengths of belief. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Makinson (1989) and Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 
( 1990) give axioms for a relation of non-monotonic 
inference and show that most well-known systems for 
non-monotonic reasoning --default logic, 
circumscription, McDermott and Doyle's modal systems 
-- fail to satisfy one or more of these axioms. Hanks 
and McDermott (1987) describe anomalies in the 
application of default rules and circumscription to an 
intuitive case of non-monotonic reasoning. In general, 
there is a growing awareness of the inadequacy of 
traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning. 
Recent work on preferential and ranked preferential 
models (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990; 
Lehmann, 1989; Makinson, 1989) overcomes some of 
these difficulties. In a preferential model, the worlds or 
states are related by a binary preference relation <. An 
inference relation r is defined by saying that A r B iff 
B is true in all the most preferred worlds in which A is 
true. Depending on the properties of <,various non­
monotonic logics result from this definition. In a 
ranked preferential model (RPM), the preference relation 
may be thought of as stemming from a well-ordering of 
some partition of the worlds (so that where w and v 
are worlds, w < v iff w occurs in a partition element 
preceding the partition element to which v belongs). 
Thus the worlds are in essence ranked, with ties 
permitted. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that despite their 
advantages over other approaches to non-monotonic 
reasoning, RPMs are still inadequate. In particular, 
they cannot adequately handle iterated belief change, a 
point already made by Spohn (1988). Here we give a 
formal proof of this claim. The proof shows that 
RPMs cannot handle reversibility of belief change: 
sometimes we learn that a piece of information we 
thought true is not true and we wish to revise our 
beliefs by going back to the state of belief we had 
before the information was given. 
We first discuss the relation between non-monotonic 
reasoning and belief change. Next, we demonstrate the 
inadequacy of RPMs to handle the reversibility of belief 
change. Finally, we examine one possible way of 
remedying the deficiency and conclude that it fails. 
2 BELIEF CHANGE AND 
INFERENCE 
A monotonic inference relation � is one for which the 
following condition holds: 
(M) lf A � C, then A&B � C. 
A non-monotonic inference relation is one for which 
(M) sometimes fails. Common-sense reasoning is 
generally thought to be non-monotonic, as exemplified 
by the following ubiquitous example: on learning that 
Tweety is a bird, I leap to the conclusion that Tweety 
flies, but on next learning that Tweety is a penguin, I 
withdraw that conclusion. So in ordinary, or common­
sense, reasoning, gaining additional information may 
cause previous inferences to be withdrawn. 
A fruitful way of viewing common-sense reasoning of 
the non-monotonic variety is as a case of belief 
revision: one is willing to non-monotonically infer B 
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from A if adding A to one's stock of beliefs results in 
l!s being believed. This way of viewing non-mono­
tonic inference suggests an investigation of the rules for 
rational belief revision, rather than seeking a weakening 
or modification of the classical relation of logical 
implication, which concerns static relations between 
propositions. 
Giirdenfors (1988) presents a widely accepted set of 
axioms for belief revision. Let B stand for a person's 
set of beliefs at a particular time, which set is assumed 
to be deductively closed (we call such a deductively 
* 
closed set a belief set). We let B A stand for the belief 
set that results when a person with belief set B comes 
to believe proposition A -- i.e. it is the result of 
revising the beliefs in B to accommodate belief in A. 
* 
B A should be distinguished from what we shall denote 
as B:, the deductive closure of B U {A} . The latter 
contains every proposition in B, the former need not if 
A contradicts the beliefs in B. In particular, if B 
* 
contains --.A, the negation of A, B A will not contain 
-,A unless A is contradictory. Giirdenfors' axioms are 
the following: 
* 
(B I) B A is a belief set. 
* 
(B2) A E BA. 
* 
(B5) B A is inconsistent iff f- -,A. 
* * 
(B6) If 1- A .. B, then B A= BB. 
* * + * 
(B8) If -,B ¢ B A' then (B A)s !;;; B A&B. 
(Bl)-(B8) are equivalent to the finitary rules for what 
Lehmann (1989) calls rational inference. 
Lehmann makes uses of a finitary inference relation 1-, 
which is taken to be a relation of non-monotonic 
implication between formulas. Here we regard it as a 
relation between nonlinguistic propositions. The rules 
listed in (Lehmann 1989) for 1- translate into 
Giirdenfors' terminology of belief set revision by 
* 
equating A 1- B with B E B A" The next section 
discusses models of belief change satisfying the above 
axioms. 
3 SEMANTICS FOR BELIEF 
CHANGE 
Ranked preferential models provide a semantics for 
rational belief change. Here we apply RPMs within the 
general possible worlds framework, taking possible 
worlds as non-linguistic entities relative to which 
propositions are true or false. As usual, we identify a 
proposition with the set of worlds in which it is true 
and we assume that every set of worlds corresponds to a 
proposition. 
Let W be the set of all possible worlds. Within this 
framework, an RPM may be considered a well-crdered 
partition of W, that is, a sequence E0, E 1, ... of disjoint 
subsets ofW such that u:1Ei =W
I. A well-ordered 
partition of worlds represents a state of belief in the 
following sense. Worlds within the same partition 
element are equally equally believable or disbelievable; 
Worlds in a given partition element are more believable 
than worlds occurring in succeeding partition elements. 
The members of the initial partition element Eo are all 
the worlds that are not disbelieved -- i.e. no world in 
Eo is believed not to hold. The worlds in the remaining 
partition elements are disbelieved. 
A well-ordered partition yields a belief set in the 
following manner. Recall that a belief set is just a 
deductively closed set of propositions, representing the 
beliefs of some agent. The initial element of the well­
ordered partition,E0, is the total content of the agent's 
belief. It can be thought of as the (possibly infinite) 
conjunction of all the propositions believed by the 
agent. A proposition is in the belief set of an agent iff 
it is entailed by the total content of the agent's belief. 
Within the set-theoretic representation of propositions 
with which we are working, proposition A entails 
Iwe do not distinguish, as does Lehmann (1989), 
between states and worlds. Given our assumption 
that the objects of belief and inference are propo­
sitions, not sentences, and that a proposition is 
any subset of worlds, the smoothness condition 
and the condition that the ranking of worlds be 
derived from a total order (Lehmann, 1989, p. 
215) together imply that the ranking of worlds 
constitutes a well-ordered partition. 
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proposition B iff A !;;;;; B. Thus the belief set of the 
agent can be defined to be {A!;;;;; W :  Eo!;;;;; A}. 
An RPM determines how beliefs are to be revised when 
new information is received. Suppose proposition A 
comes to be believed. The task is to say what the new 
total content of belief is. The rule is this: Let Ei be the 
first partition element whose intersection with A is 
non-empty (i.e. the first partition element consistent 
with A). Then the new total content of belief is Ei n A. 
Hence proposition B will be believed in the result of 
revising the agent's beliefs to accommodate A iff Ei n A 
!;;;;; B. 
4 ITERATED BELIEF CHANGE 
ANU REVERSIBILITY 
Wolfgang Spohn (1988) criticized the theory of belief 
change just presented on the grounds that it cannot 
account for iterated belief change. To handle iterated 
belief change, argued Spohn, one must know what the 
new ranking of worlds is after a belief change. RPM 
semantics only tells us what is believed after a single 
belief change; it does not tell us how the ranking of 
worlds changes. The reason this is a problem is that in 
general the result of a belief change depends, not just 
upon what is believed, but also upon epistemic 
preferences among disbelieved propositions. If all we 
know after a belief change is what propositions are be­
lieved, but not what the new ranking of worlds is, there 
is no way in general to determine the result of future 
belief changes. 
Spohn's solution was to assign numerical degrees of 
disbelief to worlds together with a rule for revising 
those degrees of disbelief when new information is 
obtained. (For details see Spohn, 1988). Given the 
strong motivation in the non-monotonic reasoning 
literature to avoid numerical approaches, this solution 
may appear unsatisfactory to many. Might it not be 
possible to supplement the theory of ranked preferential 
models with a rule for revising the ranking of worlds 
when a belief change occurs? Spohn considered two 
ways of doing so and showed that both fail. He 
concluded that accounting for iterated belief change in 
terms of well-ordered partitions " ... looks hopeless" 
(1988, p. 114). But is it really hopeless? Perhaps there 
is an acceptable way of revising rankings that Spohn 
overlooked. The next task is to show that Spohn was 
correct in his pessimism. 
A theorem proved by Lehmann and Magidor (Kraus, 
Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990, p. 216) appears at first 
glance to show Spohn wrong. Formulated in terms of 
belief sets, the theorem says that a belief revision 
function satisfies (B1)-(B8) if and only if it is defined by 
some RPM. This result seems to imply that RPMs 
capture exactly the logic of belief change. 
The resolution of this difficulty is that while (B 1)-(B8) 
may completely capture the logic of a single step of 
belief change, they do not completely capture the logic 
of iterated belief change. To distinguish between RPMs 
and Spohnian belief revision, additional axioms for 
iterated belief change are needed. Two axioms for 
iterated belief change are proposed below, but there is 
no claim that these axioms are complete. 
The first axiom concerns what happens when more 
precise information is obtained. Suppose the agent 
comes to believe proposition A and revises her beliefs 
accordingly. Suppose next that the agent comes to 
believe B, where B entails A. That is, the agent gets 
more precise information. What should the agent's 
beliefs be after receiving the second piece of 
information? I want to say that her beliefs should be 
exactly the beliefs she would have had if only the 
second piece of information had been received. 
Formally, this amounts to the axiom: 
* * * 
(B9) If B �A, then (B A)s = BB. 
Thus according to (B9), if the agent first comes to 
believe that some object is, say, a tree and then comes 
to believe that it is a pine tree, her beliefs should be the 
same as they would have been had she initially come to 
believe it was a pine tree. 
The second axiom is analogous, this time dealing with 
conflicting pieces of information. If the agent first 
comes to believe A and next comes to believe B, where 
A and B are inconsistent, I want to say that the net 
effect of these two changes is just as if only the latter 
had occurred. That is, coming to accept a belief that 
conflicts with a previous piece of information "wipes 
out" the effect of the previous information. Thus the 
axiom: 
Spohn's system of belief revision satisfies both (B9) 
and (BIO). 
To show that RPMs are inadequate to handle iterated 
belief change, assume that some rule for revising 
rankings of worlds is given for RPMs. (B9) and (B10) 
imply the following regarding any such rule: that when 
a belief change involves just the proposition A, the 
relative rankings of worlds within the sets A, -,A 
remain the same. That is, if worlds w1 and w2 are both 
in A and w 1 precedes w2, then after updating on A, w 1 
still precedes w2. Similarly for worlds within -,A. To 
show this, let B be the current belief set, < the 
precedence relation between worlds, and note that by the 
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updating rule for RPMs the following conditions are 
equivalent for worlds w I• w2: 
Let < be the old precedence relation and let <' be the 
new precedence relation determined by revising the old 
ranking to acconunodate belief in proposition A. 
Suppose wi, w2 E A and wi < w2. By (B9), 
* * * . (B�{wi,wz} =B{w l,wz} and smce wi < w2, 
* * * B{wi,wz} = {wl} .  Hence (B A){wi,wz} = {wi}, so 
w1 < 'w2. A similar argument can be given for the 
case in which w 1, w2 belong to --.A, by appealing to 
(B10). 
To show that RPMs do not allow for the reversibility 
of belief change in ail cases, we must be more precise 
about what reversibility amounts to. In abstract form, a 
theory of belief revision is a function/ from the cross­
product space of belief states and epistemic inputs to the 
space of belief states. Reversibility means that for any 
belief state S and epistemic input E, there is an 
epistemic input E' such that S = f(f(S,E),E'). What 
we learn, we can unlearn. 
Should any conditions be placed on the epistemic input 
that returns us to the previous state? It is reasonable, I 
think, to require that it only involve the proposition 
that caused the belief change in the first place. 
Otherwise, there is too much leeway: we could cheat 
and use information about the starting belief state to 
pick the right proposition or sequence of propositions 
to get back to where we started. More formally, let an 
epistemic input be an ordered pair <A,a>, where A is a 
proposition and a is an epistemic attitude. In the 
Spohn system, for example, an epistemic attitude is a 
strength of belief, so the epistemic input <A,a> repre­
sents coming to believe coming to believe A with 
strength a. Then the reversibility condition says: 
(R) If S is a belief state, A a proposition, and a 
an epistemic attitude, then there exists an 
epistemic attitude � such that S = 
f(f(S, <A,a> ), <A,�>). 
In the case of RPMs, an epistemic input is formally 
simply a proposition, but it is implicitly understood to 
be a proposition together with an attitude of belief 
towards that proposition. More generally, we will say 
that an epistemic input for an RPM is a proposition 
together with an attitude of belief, disbelief, or 
suspension of judgment (neither believing nor 
disbelieving). To allow numerical degrees of belief as 
inputs to RPMs would go against the spirit of much re­
search in non-monotonic reasoning, but we will none­
theless later consider the possibility of deriving numeri­
cal degrees of belief from RPMs. For the time being, 
however, we assume that an epistemic input to a RPM 
is a non-numerical one of the sort just described. 
Within the formalism of RPMs, an attitude of belief 
can be represented as the addition of a proposition (to 
the stock of beliefs) and the attitude of disbelief also by 
the addition of a proposition, namely the negation of 
the proposition disbelieved. A technical problem arises, 
though, for the attitude of suspension of belief. There 
seems to be no way to represent coming to suspend 
judgment in a proposition within the formalism of 
RPMs. This problem can be skirted if we define the 
belief set that results from suspending judgment in A as 
the intersection of the belief set resulting from belief in 
A with the belief set resulting from belief in ..,A. (That 
is, what you believe when you suspend judgment in a 
proposition is exactly what you would believe whether 
you believed or disbelieved the proposition in question.) 
We are now in a position to argue that no belief 
revision rule for RPMs that satisfies (B9) and (B l 0) can 
also satisfy (R). First consider a simple model in 
which there are only four worlds, the four boolean 
atoms formed from the atomic propositions A and B. 
Thus the set of worlds W is {A&B, A&-,B, -,A&B, 
-,A&-,B}. Let RPM r 1 rank the worlds thus: 
{-,A&B}, {A&B, A&-,B,--.A&-,B} (the most 
believable worlds listed first). Let RPM r2 rank the 
worlds so: {-,A&B}, {A&B, A&-,B}, {-,A&-,B}. If the 
revision rule satisfies both (B9) and (B 1 0), then coming 
to believe A will take both r1 and r2 to the RPM r3 = 
{A&B, A&-,B}, {-,A&B}, {--.A&-,B}. Are there 
epistemic inputs involving only proposition A that take 
r3 into ri and into r2? Neither belief in A nor 
suspension of judgment regarding A will take r3 into 
either r I or r2. Only disbelief in A -- i.e. belief in -,A ­
- will do so. But belief in -,A cannot simultaneously 
take r3 to both r1 and r2. Without loss of generality, 
suppose belief in -,A takes r3 into r2. Then there is no 
way that r 1 can be recovered - belief change is 
irreversible. 
This argument can be generalized. Let W be any set of 
worlds, finite or infinite, with cardinality greater than 
three. Partition W into four non-empty subsets W 1, 
w2,w3, andW4. Define A to beW1 U w2. Then 
coming to believe A will take both the rankings <W 3• 
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.,W3> and <W3, A, W 4> into the ranking <A, w3, 
W 4> and the argument goes through as before. 
4.1 USING NUMERICAL STRENGTHS OF 
BELIEF 
It might be suggested that the comparison between the 
Spohn system and RPMs is unfair because the former 
makes use of strengths of belief, but such epistemic 
resources are denied to the latter. Perhaps if the episte­
mic inputs to RPMs were expressed in terms of 
strengths of belief, reversibility of belief change could 
be achieved. This suggestion will not work, however, 
for the following reason. Consider the equivalent prob­
lem of defming degrees of disbelief in terms of RPMs. 
Let d() be a disbelief function over the set of proposi­
tions. To derive d() from a given RPM and to maintain 
consistency with the belief updating rule for RPMs, we 
must impose the following conditions on d(): 
(i) For w E W, d(w) is a function of the rank 
of w. 
(ii) For A, B !;;;; W. d(A) < d(B) iff where Ei is the 
first partition element consistent with A U B, 
EinB = ¢. 
The first condition is imposed to capture the idea that 
knowing the rank of a world determines its degree of 
disbelief. The second condition is imposed to maintain 
consistency with the updating rule for RPMs: if the 
degree of disbelief in A is less than the degree of dis-
belief in B, then if A V B becomes believed, A should 
be believed but B should still have some positive degree 
of disbelief; conversely, if coming to believe A V B 
results in a belief state in which A is believed but B is 
disbelieved, then the initial degree of disbelief in A 
must have been less than the initial degree of disbelief 
in B. 
These conditions imply that where A is a proposition, 
d(A) must equal the minimal rank of the worlds in A. 
(i) and (ii) imply that d()'s range is isomorphic with the 
set of possible ranks; hence we may as well identify 
degrees of disbelief with the natural numbers 0, 1, ... , 
and identify the degree of disbelief in a world with that 
world's rank. Let A be a proposition and EA the first 
partition element consistent with A. Let w* E 
EA nA. By the definition of EA, w* is a world in A of 
minimal rank. Letting B be {w*} in condition (ii), we 
see that d(A);;:: d(w*). Again by (ii), d(w*) < d(A) iff 
E An A is empty, which contradicts the definition of 
EA- Hence d(A) =d(w*) and we conclude that d(A) = 
min{rank(w): wE A}. 
Hence we are forced to define the degree of disbelief in a 
proposition as the minimal degree of disbelief of the 
worlds in the proposition. But so defined, degrees of 
disbelief will not help RPMs achieve reversibility of 
belief change. For in the example given above in 
which belief in A brought the two rankings r 1 and r2 
into the same ranking r3, the two initial rankings 
determine the same degree of belief for A (namely, 1) 
and for -,A (namely, 0). But no specification of either 
of these degrees of disbelief can move r3 back to both 
r1 and r2. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Researchers on Uncertainty should find the results 
presented in this paper of interest because they support 
the view that an adequate account of belief revision (and 
of reasoning in general) must involve the notion of 
degrees of belief, so that numerical uncertainty has a 
prominence in our reasoning that many have been 
unwilling to grant it. This should not come as a 
surprise, though, to those aware of the emphasis in 
recent years on qualitative aspects of probabilistic 
reasoning (e.g., see Pearl (1988), especially chapter 10). 
A stronger result than that proved in this paper would 
be a representation theorem for the Spohn system: a 
theorem that says a belief revision function satisfies a 
certain set of axioms iff it coincides with some 
Spohnian belief revision function. Future research will 
look at the possibility of obtaining such a result. 
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